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Categories All the Way Down 
Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy ∗ 
Abstract: »Kategorien auf der ganzen Linie«. Scores and classifications are dual 
to one another. Cardinal and ordinal measures are repeatedly used to produce 
nominal classifications of essential worth. Conversely, presumptively natural 
kinds provide the basis for new measurement and scoring systems. Over time, 
the iterative application of nominal classifications and quantifying measures 
produce involuted, nested systems whose structure and origins are hard to dis-
entangle. While careful studies of earlier systems and methods have often un-
covered these arbitrary aspects, newer technical tools for classification are at 
once substantially more opaque than their predecessors and more likely to be 
employed on very large scales. The classification situations to which they give 
rise thus have the potential to produce the sort of naturalized facticity charac-
teristic of classical social facts. 
Keywords: Market classifications, scores, categories, classification situations, 
market sociology.  
 
The articles in this HSR Special Issue “Market Classifications” explore scoring 
and classification tools across a range of economic settings, and from a variety 
of perspectives. The settings range from the German wine market (Diaz-Bone 
2017) to the American subprime credit sector (Rona-Tas 2017), from the sus-
tainability and social investment sector to the British fashion world (Nagel et 
al. 2017; Schiller-Merkens 2017; all in this issue). The perspectives taken vari-
ously see scoring and classification methods as tools for solving coordination 
or action problems in markets, as means for establishing and maintaining iden-
tities (Pridmore and Hämäläinen 2017, this issue) and as portable judgment 
devices with the capacity to be put to use beyond their original context (Chia-
pello and Godefroy 2017, this issue). Across the contributions is the sense that, 
as Citron and Pasquale (2014) have suggested, we now live in “scored socie-
ties” where increasingly large tracts of social life are subject to these methods, 
and in an increasingly automated manner. Discussing the credit crisis of 2007-08, 
MacKenzie (2011, 1830) asks “Should we understand the conduct of those 
practices and the use of their results as having been driven by belief in them, or 
should it be seen as cynical, as driven simply by the pursuit of gain (e.g., by 
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earning fees from ratings)?” As devices or tools for action and judgment, scoring 
and classification methods seem both in and out of the hands of their users, 
instrumental but disciplining, indispensable yet opaque. In this short paper, we 
ask: just how opaque?  
1.  The Duality of Scores and Classifications 
Scores and classifications are dual to one another, in two senses. First, tools for 
scoring and ranking – for measuring and comparing on a cardinal or ordinal 
scale – are repeatedly used to produce nominal classifications associated with 
judgements of essential worth (Fourcade 2016). Continuous measures are cut 
into ranked scales, which in turn come to life as classes or categories of person, 
organization, or group. Second, over time the nominal classes and categories 
we interpret as basic to social life provide the starting point for new efforts to 
measure, score, and rank again. Prior classifications provide the basis for new 
measurements and scores, and scoring systems give rise to newly classified 
kinds.  
Modern institutions, both public and private, rely on tools and procedures 
that track individuals, assess their behavior, and assign them membership in 
various categories. They use them, variously, in their efforts to monitor con-
duct, calculate risk, or extract value. Moved by the seemingly infinite possibili-
ties offered by digital technologies, contemporary market organizations relent-
lessly segment and score large quantities of behavioral data. Seeing and 
knowing people by way of these tools changes how markets and states work. 
Their sorting and slotting procedures shape the availability and price of many 
goods and services, not only in traditional commodities markets but also in 
health care, insurance, education, legal services, and housing. Beyond these 
conventionally institutional arenas, we also increasingly find them reformatting 
the structure of ordinary sociability, from opportunities for friendship and 
dating to getting around town at the weekend. As we have argued elsewhere, 
the partially achieved, partially assigned categories that result from this wide-
spread expansion of algorithmic decision-making can be thought of as classifi-
cation situations. They shape the possibilities offered to individuals differenti-
ated by them – in Weberian terms, these systems structure their life chances 
(Fourcade and Healy 2013, reprinted in this HSR Special Issue). 
 Across the range of markets and settings they organize, scores and the cate-
gories generated by them are market-derived and market-oriented tools. They 
identify important or valuable individuals, where the criteria for “value” is 
determined by criteria internal to the particular market in question. To the 
extent that these modes of evaluation are shared across market settings, and 
perhaps more importantly to the extent that data, methods, and tools for evalua-
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tion are also shared in this way (Rona-Tas 2017), classification situations may 
cohere in a systematic and increasingly consequential manner.  
From the point of view of individuals, meanwhile, classification situations 
have objective consequences that can be measured in prices lowered or raised, 
fees incurred or waived, and opportunities proffered or lost. They also have a 
phenomenological aspect (Fourcade and Healy 2016). Because these new tech-
nologies of social classification are personal, pervasive, and moralized, the 
experience of being “well-situated” by them is often a pleasing one. We feel 
that the market or service (Amazon, Netflix, etc.) “gets us.”  
Occasionally, though, this expectation is betrayed. Personal cost, inconven-
ience, and awkwardness typically accompany a poor match. For the conven-
tionally well-situated, a bad match occurs when the wrong product is pitched, 
or pitched at the wrong price. In these cases it is increasingly common for 
people to be consciously annoyed at the choices the algorithm has made for 
them. (How can Amazon be so stupid as to recommend this to me, given how 
much they know about my purchasing?) More interesting are cases where the 
quality of the match is “good” from the market’s point of view but potentially 
“bad” from the point of view of the customer’s sense of their own experience 
or identity. For example, the value of an individual in the subprime credit mar-
ket may come from them having a “bad” credit score and thus ending up in the 
“wrong” category. They would prefer to be classified elsewhere, but the poten-
tially stigmatizing classification is all that is available. In these cases, the phe-
nomenology of one’s classification situation may involve both firms and cus-
tomers, who may be seeking some destigmatized understanding of the 
exploitative or predatory arrangements they are about to enter into. Subprime 
customers are encouraged to feel (and often do feel) that the expensive credit 
product is “right for them,” or presented by a firm that “understands their 
needs.” Increasingly, the same is true of the experience of those who sign up to 
for-profit schools and colleges (Cottom 2017), or poor-quality health plans. 
Deceptive sales pitches for bad products are as old as the market itself, but they 
find new expression through the machinery of category matching and tailored 
pricing.  
2.  Categories All the Way Down 
The study of classification is nothing new in the social sciences either. Under-
standing the social foundations of the construction of the categories through 
which people apprehend the world around them, and struggles over this process 
(Bourdieu 1984), is the central problem of the sociology of knowledge. Schol-
ars since Durkheim have singled out this question as a necessary precondition 
to any properly sociological or anthropological inquiry. As Warren Schmaus 
puts it, “social life as we know it, [Durkheim] thought, would not be possible if 
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people did not share certain conceptions of time, space, causality, and classifi-
cation” (Schmaus 2004, 4). Shared categories, vocabularies and nomenclatures 
express, enable and sustain social coordination. They also align and mobilize – 
in other words, they are political in essence. The “economics of convention” 
approach as it developed in France in the 1980s and 1990s emphasized this 
point, seeing categories and in particular statistical nomenclatures as devices 
that constitute communities. In a world marked by both uncertainty and the 
need for stable qualifications, different types of conventions organize the 
pragmatics and formatting of action: people appraise and classify the persons 
and things around them, and they do so in reference to emergent sets of com-
mon expectations, “grammars of worth,” and evaluative conventions (Boltanski 
and Thévenot 2006; Lamont 2012). 
It is in the work of Laurent Thévenot and Alain Desrosières that the tight 
connection between classification and quantification is most explicitly articu-
lated. (See Diaz-Bone, this issue for a summary; Desrosières 1995; Thévenot 
2016; Diaz-Bone and Didier 2016).1 Quantifying implies sorting, and to sort is 
to pass through a categorical lens. There is no measurement that does not go 
through the lens of a classifier. As we, in this issue, ponder over the classifying 
consequences of market scoring processes, we must remember that these new 
classification situations, produced by measurement and quantification efforts, 
are themselves built on top of other classifying practices and the schemes 
yielded by them. The classifying (a score, a ranking, a rating) is itself a classi-
fied product.2 For instance, the composite devices that are our main focus here, 
such as credit scores, depend in the first instance on choices about the way 
credit events are defined and measured. A small change in the measurement 
system, or a reweighting of the precise mix of factors deemed relevant for an 
assessment, may have dramatic effects on the outcomes. 
Quantification not only implies classification, it implies classifications on 
top of other classifications – indeed a classificatory architecture that pulls in 
variegated ways of boxing and measuring people and things to some end. The 
pristine numerical output of a final score may bear a tangled relationship to its 
underlying strata of classes, groups, and types. In this sense, scores are catego-
ries all the way down. Most scoring systems are dependent on the categorical 
work of third parties. This tends to make them vulnerable to fads and shifts in 
data collection, measurement, and organization that happen elsewhere. For 
instance, a change in a bank’s approach to credit limits will automatically re-
verberate into the credit score of its customers, since the ratio between balance 
transfer and credit limit is a common component of the latter. A lower limit will 
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worsen the score, while a higher limit will automatically improve it, even in the 
absence of any active intervention by the users. 
Second, if scores are categories all the way down, then they might offer in-
finite possibilities for combination. The design of a new type of score leads 
immediately to the emergence of a field of competitors, all vying to establish 
dominance over a particular type of measurement, or at least over a niche mar-
ket within it. If your magazine wants a piece of the college rankings business, 
better find some unique way of slicing the data. Indeed the most powerful 
scores in the economy are those that combine stable market anchoring roles 
with flexibility in implementation. Credit scores have that quality. They gener-
ally anchor the lending business (few would lend without a credit check) but 
the companies that produce them have also made the device customizable to 
predict, for instance, the likelihood that an applicant will be tempted by and 
pay as agreed on a particular type of loan. As Sevignani aptly reminds us in his 
own contribution (2017, this issue), asymmetric relations between owners and 
users of the means of information, surveillance and communication are a 
source of exploitation in the classic Marxist sense, where powerful companies 
are able to appropriate the wealth created by users as they navigate digital 
systems. Importantly, the systems themselves also facilitate a derivative form 
of exploitation where the data thus obtained is repurposed and manipulated to 
facilitate the extraction of profit. In Donald MacKenzie’s (2006) phrase, bor-
rowed from Milton Friedman, digital technologies are not simply cameras that 
provide an objective picture of the customer’s creditworthiness or reputation. 
They have become the engine of the value extraction machine: the wide-
ranging knowledge on users enables a fine-tuning of the products on offer to 
broader aspects of the person, from the ability to detect someone’s reservation 
price to identifying their propensity to be fooled.  
Third, if scores are composed of categories, then understanding how the re-
sulting sausage, so to speak, is made, is big business. Wendy Espeland and 
Michael Sauder’s recent study picks apart the structure and effects of the domi-
nant US News and World Report ranking of Law Schools in the United States 
(Espeland and Sauder, 2016). The system is of interest for several reasons. 
First, the ranking is not “official” in the sense of being sponsored by the state, 
or even by a professional association of lawyers or legal academics. Neverthe-
less, it is the chief means by which aspiring law students and Law School 
Deans alike orient themselves to the public status order of their discipline. 
Second, the ranking is calculated from a mixture of sources, ranging from the 
average standardized test scores and undergraduate grade point averages of 
admitted students, to measures of faculty and student expenditure. It also in-
cludes a reputational component extracted from a survey of Law School Deans 
and placement directors, legal professionals, and judges. Some of these sources 
are themselves highly refined individual-level instruments being used in the 
“off-label” manner Rona-Tas (2017) describes. Others are organizational fea-
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tures of the schools that are somewhat under the control of the staff. Still others 
are measures of the existence of the very status order that the ranking will 
quantify and express. Schools seek to manipulate their place in the pecking 
order by focusing their action on these various components of the ranking, that 
is, on the classifications that are baked into the US News and World Report 
performance measure. But this work requires a delicate – and somewhat unsta-
ble – balancing act, since some components have inherently contradictory 
dynamics. For instance, given the existing applicant pool and the institutional-
ized measures that are available, it may be impossible to simultaneously in-
crease measured diversity and test scores. When faced with dilemmas of this 
sort, very high-status actors may occasionally move unilaterally to rebalance 
the regime, ignoring or shifting their criteria while banking on their old-
fashioned unquantified public status to carry them through.3 But most actors in 
a status order do not have this move available to them. This is a rejoinder to 
Karoline Krenn’s point in her article (Krenn 2017, this issue) that powerful or 
wealthy actors have in effect more freedom vis-à-vis objective measurement 
systems than less privileged ones. 
Law schools and similar professional rankings are opaque and transparent at 
the same time. They are internally opaque, in that they incorporate a heteroge-
neous body of measures and weigh them in a way that, if not entirely arbitrary, 
is at least open to question. Yet they are transparent in the sense that it remains 
possible to see the various ingredients. Indeed, one of the central puzzles of the 
rise of third-party rating and ranking systems in this area is why they have been 
so successful. The hold they exercise over the minds of applicants and the 
disciplining effects they have on decision-makers at professional schools seem 
out of all proportion to both the authority of the entity doing the ranking (a 
news magazine relatively few people read) and the quality of the methods used 
to generate the results. Moreover, the feedback built into the measures seems to 
ensure the reproduction of the existing status order in an obvious way. And yet 
even so poor a measure of status as this has successfully acquired the mantle of 
an unavoidable, objective social fact about legal education in the United States. 
The constraint is deeply felt: in Espeland and Sauder’s phrase, the rankings act 
as “engines of anxiety” for applicants and administrators alike, , who cannot 
                                                             
3  See, for example, Harvard Law School’s recent decision to accept Graduate Record Examina-
tion (GRE) scores from applicants instead of the traditionally required Law School Admis-
sions Test (LSAT) score. The decision was taken on the grounds of diversity, of a general kind. 
A spokesperson said the school was seeking to “diversify our community in terms of aca-
demic background, country of origin, and financial circumstances.” Note that, even in a case 
like this, Harvard’s decision is not to abandon its use of a standardized test but to take ad-
vantage of a somewhat different test instrument for moderately off-label use. See Elizabeth 
Olson, “Harvard Law School, Moving to Expand Applicant Pool, Will Accept GRE”, New York 
Times, March 9, 2017, p. B5. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/business/dealbook/ 
harvard-law-will-accept-gre-scores.html> (Accessed March 9, 2017). 
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help but submit to what Krenn in her introduction to this issue (2017) calls “the 
measurement fallacy.” This anxiety, in turn, fuels a prosperous consulting 
industry specializing in the management or gaming of ratings. The process is 
very similar, indeed, to the search engine optimization industry that developed 
around Google’s algorithm, PageRank (Ziewitz 2015). Sometimes the rankers 
even provide these governance services themselves, as in the case of the Times 
Higher Education World University Rankings, which is marketing “strategic 
solutions” for universities to “improve through performance analysis and 
benchmarking.”4 Indeed the opportunity to sell a suite of associated services 
may be the prime motivation for investing in the development of a new ranking 
or scoring method in the first place. The production of classification situations 
is a valuation practice (Krüger and Reinhart 2017, this issue) that has both 
evaluative and valorizing, or economic, aspirations (Vatin 2013).  
3.  Whither the Categories? 
The relationship between scores and rankings on the one hand, and the categories 
they rely upon on the other, raises a fundamental problem in the sociology of 
knowledge. Donald MacKenzie (2011) reminds us that it was in part the financial 
actors’ belief in the facticity of their new composite products, the ABS CDOs, 
or tranches of tranches of bundles of mortgages, that blinded them to the dangers 
within. In their efforts to redistribute risk through securitization, people lost 
sight of both the declining quality of the components (the category ‘all the way 
down,’ the individual mortgage) and the possibility of even a modest correla-
tion among those ABSs, which the 2008 credit crisis ultimately revealed. As 
MacKenzie notes, the market participants overlooked these risks partly because 
they believed them to be good tools, and partly because it was in their financial 
interest to act as though they were good. There was a lot of money at stake.  
As the skills required to understand the internal structure of algorithms be-
come more demanding, ranking and scoring devices are less easily accountable. 
Furthermore, the inner workings of the vast majority of scores, rankings and 
algorithms currently in use are deliberately shrouded in secrecy. The opacity of 
instruments in the name of state or trade secrets lies beneath the “black box 
society” criticized by Frank Pasquale (2015) and Catherine O’Neill (2016). But 
as Jenna Burrell (2016) has argued, these two modalities of opacity (proprietary 
codes and technical know-how) have now been superseded by another, more 
intractable form. Machine learning procedures have been developed in cases 
where an explicit logic of decision-making remains elusive, or simply where 
                                                             
4  <http://timeshighereducationonline.com/clienthub/strategic-solutions.html> (Accessed March 
8, 2017). 
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the abundance of data makes such an approach more efficient. In contrast with 
traditional artificial intelligence, where computers were programmed to follow 
an algorithm designed by a coder, the machine-learning approach uses statistics 
to identify patterns directly in the data. The computer “learns” from these pat-
terns, and optimizes its performance of a task accordingly. Computers can also 
learn to classify data on their own, and thereby predict where new data should 
fit. In other words they can produce a model, but the difference with human 
programming is that the rationale for why certain decision rules end up in the 
model is not always obvious. In the most advanced techniques, this rationale is 
in fact impenetrable for the human mind. Owing to the recent resurgence of 
‘deep’ learning procedures, the model’s outputs are now based on multiple, 
sometimes thousands of processing layers. Each layer produces its own repre-
sentation of some piece of the data and relays what it has learned to the next 
layer, and to the next layer, and so on until the final layer, which uses all the 
information passed along the way to generate the classification.  
Methods for layered neural networks have been developed since the 1960s, 
and they began to be seen in more widespread use in applied statistics in the 
1980s and 1990s. At the time they were seen mostly as “a flexible non-linear 
extension of multiple logistic regression” (Venables and Ripley 2002, 342). 
Their usefulness seemed relatively limited. In comparison to more familiar 
methods they were both less transparent and caused more computational trou-
ble. However, continuing research, the rapid expansion of cheap, large-scale 
computing power, and the concomitant availability of enormous datasets for 
analysis resulted in a step change in the usefulness of these methods. Their 
application began to yield rapid progress in notoriously intractable problems 
such as speech recognition, image classification, and natural language pro-
cessing. The result has been a huge surge of interest in these approaches, and a 
new wave of experimentation with them in many different areas.  
A characteristic feature of discussion around deep learning is that while its 
success is results-driven, a satisfactory theory of why these methods work so 
well is harder to provide. Research and applications continue to surge, but it is 
striking to see the enthusiasm for these methods intermingled with the frank 
acknowledgment, even by experts, of how opaque they are in practice. It is 
common enough for well-understood technical methods to be deployed as 
packaged tools for use by nonexpert (but often still “professional”) practitioners. 
But deep learning techniques have much more of this quality than usual. Due to 
the high-dimensional character of the data and the model, the way these proce-
dures operate, calculate, and classify is typically impervious to human interpre-
tation. It is often impossible in practice to identify the role of individual inputs, 
which makes the devices rather intractable to manage when problems arise. 
That was Google’s hard-learned lesson after its image recognition software 
classified black people as gorillas, and the only workable solution (since the 
classifier could not be unpicked to fix this error alone) involved preventing any 
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photo from being tagged to the word gorilla. Categories all the way down, but 
what were the categories in the end? 
As the tools of deep learning are just beginning to be applied across market 
settings – for instance in credit scoring –, the issue of opacity is returning to the 
forefront with a vengeance. The law requires that scoring tools be interpretable 
or comprehensible to scorer and scored alike, but the new methods are much 
harder to make sense of than the old, both in a technical way and in a regulatory 
one (Kroll et al., forthcoming). At the same time, they are also more powerful, 
and better able to generate the kind of outcomes that mortgage and credit issuers 
want (e.g., better predictions of risk). Once again, we see the prospect of enig-
matic methods that are at once technically effective, rhetorically useful, and 
financially rewarding, often combined with a certain kind of blind confidence 
that nothing will go terribly wrong, as in the credit crisis case. 
Traditional mechanisms of social classification are powerful. Legal or polit-
ical classifications of an arbitrary sort can become imbued with the character of 
a taken-for-granted fact. Amateurish or barely defensible data collection and 
ranking schemes turn out to have the capacity to control the status order of 
professional fields, partly just in virtue of their quantitative character. Perhaps a 
deeply arbitrary order is better than no order. Perhaps, as Gillespie (2014, 192) 
points out, “we want relief from the duty of being skeptical about information 
we can never assure for certain.” The new classifiers seem to combine and 
supercharge these features. They are technically more sophisticated than many 
of the methods that preceded them, and are also set to be applied on a much 
larger scale. At the same time, they are far more difficult to fathom – perhaps 
intrinsically so – even for well-informed users. To exaggerate, but only a little, 
they fuse the rational legitimacy of technical analysis with the enigmatic but 
undeniable force of a Delphic oracle. The classification situations to which 
these methods give rise thus have the potential to produce the sort of natural-
ized facticity characteristic of truly social facts. Both the act of classification 
and the criteria for it fade into the background, and we are left with what seems 
simply to be the world itself, delivered to us as a set of natural categories that it 
is in our best interest to believe in, act upon, or live up to. 
References  
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Burrell, Jenna. 2016. How the machine ‘thinks’: Understanding opacity in machine 
learning algorithms. Big Data and Society 3 (1): 1-12.  
Chiapello, Eve, and Gaetan Godefroy. 2017. The dual function of judgment devic-
es. Why does the plurality of market classifications matter? Historical Social Re-
search 42 (1): 152-88. doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.152-188. 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  295 
Citron, Danielle Keats, and Frank A. Pasquale. 2014. The Scored Society: Due 
Process for Automated Predictions. Washington Law Review 89: 1-33. 
Cottom, Tressie McMillan. 2017. Lower Ed: The Troubling Rise of For-Profit 
Colleges in the New Economy. New York: New Press. 
Desrosières, Alain. 1995. Classer et mesurer: les deux faces de l’argument statis-
tique. Réseaux 13: 11-29. 
Diaz-Bone, Rainer. 2017. Market Classifications, quantifications and quality con-
ventions in markets – Perspectives of the economics of convention. Historical 
Social Research 42 (1): 238-62. doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.238-262. 
Diaz-Bone, Rainer, and Emmanuel Didier, eds. 2016. Conventions and Quantifica-
tion – Transdisciplinary Perspectives on Statistics and Classifications [Special 
Issue] Historical Social Research 41 (2). <http://www.gesis.org/en/hsr/archive/ 
2016/412-conventions-and-quantification/>. 
Espeland, Wendy, and Michael Sauder. 2016. Engines of Anxiety. Academic Rank-
ings, Reputation and Accountability. Russell Sage Foundation.  
Fourcade, Marion. 2016. Ordinalization. Sociological Theory 34: 175-95.  
Fourcade, Marion, and Kieran Healy. 2013. Classification Situations: Life Chances 
in the Neoliberal Economy. Accounting, Organizations and Society 38: 559-72. 
Fourcade, Marion and Kieran Healy. 2016. Seeing Like a Market. Socioeconomic 
Review 0 (0): 1-12. 
Fourcade, Marion and Kieran Healy. 2017. Classification Situations: Life-Chances 
in the Neoliberal Era. Historical Social Research 42 (1): 23-51. [Reprint of Four-
cade and Healy 2013]. 
Gillespie, Tarleton. 2014. The Relevance of Algorithms. In Media Technologies. 
Essays on Communication, Materiality, and Society (Inside Technology), ed. Tar-
leton Gillespie, Pablo Boczkowski, and Kirsten Foot, 167-94. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Krenn, Karoline. 2017. Segmented intermediation. Advice concepts in German 
financial services. Historical Social Research 42 (1): 123-51. doi: 10.12759/hsr. 
42.2017.1.123-51. 
Kroll, Joshua A., Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. 
Reidenberg, David G. Robinson, and Harlan Yu. Forthcoming. Accountable Al-
gorithms. University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 
Krüger, Anne and Martin Reinhart. 2017. Theories of Valuation – Building Blocks 
for Conceptualizing Valuation Between Practice and Structure. Historical Social 
Research 42 (1): 263-85. doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.263-285. 
Lamont, Michèle. 2017. Toward a Comparative Sociology of Valuation and Eval-
uation. Annual Review of Sociology 38: 201-21. 
MacKenzie, Donald. 2006. An Engine, Not a Camera. How Financial Models 
Shape Markets. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
MacKenzie, Donald. 2011. The Credit Crisis as a Problem in the Sociology of 
Knowledge. American Journal of Sociology 116: 1778-841. 
Nagel, Sebastien, Stefanie Hiss, Daniela Woschnack, and Bernd Teufel. 2017. 
Between Efficiency and Resilience: The Classification of Companies According 
to their Sustainability Performance. Historical Social Research 42 (1): 189-210. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.189-210. 
O’Neill, Catherine. 2016. Weapons of Math Destruction. How Big Data Increases 
Inequality and Threatens Democracy. Crown. 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  296 
Pasquale, Frank. 2015. The Black Box Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Pridmore, Jason and Lalu Hämäläinen. 2017. Segmentation in (in)action: Marketing 
and ‘yet to be installed’ role of big and social media data. Historical Social Re-
search 42 (1): 103-22. doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.103-122. 
Rona-Tas, Akos. 2017. The Off-Label Use of Consumer Credit Ratings. Historical 
Social Research 42 (1): 52-76. doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.52-76 
Schmaus, Warren. 2004. Rethinking Durkheim and His Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Schiller-Merkens, Simone. 2017. Will green remain the new black? Dynamics in 
the self-categorization of ethical fashion designers. Historical Social Research 42 
(1): 211-37. doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.211-237.  
Sevignani, Sebastian. 2017. Surveillance, classification, and social inequality in 
informational capitalism: The relevance of exploitation in the context of markets 
in information. Historical Social Research 42 (1): 77-102. doi: 10.12759/ 
hsr.42.2017.1.77-102. 
Thévenot, Laurent. 2016. From Social Coding to Economics of Convention: A 
Thirty-Year Perspective on the Analysis of Qualification and Quantification In-
vestments. Historical Social Research 41 (2): 96-117. doi: 10.12759/hsr.41. 
2016.2.96-117. 
Vatin, François. 2013. Valuation as Evaluating and Valorizing. Valuation Studies 1 
(1): 31-50. 
Venables, William N. and Brian D. Ripley. 2002. Modern Applied Statistics with S. 
Fourth Edition. New York: Springer.  
Ziewitz, Malte. 2015. Spectacular Algorithms. Presentation at the Center for Sci-
ence, Technology and Society, UC Berkeley, November 5. 
Ziewitz, Malte. 2016. Governing algorithms: Myth, mess and methods. Science, 
Technology, and Human Values 41 (1): 3-16. 
Historical Social Research 
Historische Sozialforschung 
Other articles published in this Special Issue:
Karoline Krenn  
Markets and Classifications – Constructing Market Orders in the Digital Age. An Introduction. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.7-22 
Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy 
Classification Situations: Life-Chances in the Neoliberal Era. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.23-51 
Akos Rona-Tas 
The Off-Label Use of Consumer Credit Ratings. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.52-76 
Sebastian Sevignani 
Surveillance, Classification, and Social Inequality in Informational Capitalism: The Relevance of 
Exploitation in the Context of Markets in Information. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.77-102 
Jason Pridmore & Lalu Elias Hämäläinen 




Segmented Intermediation. Advice Concepts in German Financial Services. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.123-151 
Eve Chiapello & Gaëtan Godefroy 
The Dual Function of Judgment Devices. Why does the Plurality of Market Classifications Matter? 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.152-188 
Sebastian Nagel, Stefanie Hiss, Daniela Woschnack & Bernd Teufel 




Will Green Remain the New Black? Dynamics in the Self-Categorization of Ethical Fashion Designers  
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.211-237 
Rainer Diaz-Bone 
Classifications, Quantifications and Quality Conventions in Markets – Perspectives of the Economics of 
Convention. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.238-262 
Anne K. Krüger & Martin Reinhart 
Theories of Valuation – Building Blocks for Conceptualizing Valuation Between Practice and Structure. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.263-285 
Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy 
Categories All the Way Down. 
doi: 10.12759/hsr.42.2017.1.286-296 
For further information on our journal, including tables of contents, article abstracts, 
and our extensive online archive, please visit http://www.gesis.org/en/hsr. 
